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Abstract
This paper documents labor mobility flows from multinationals (MNEs) to non-
MNEs in Norwegian manufacturing during the 1990s. 14,400 workers in MNEs move
to non-MNEs during this period. By the year 2000, 28 percent of the non-MNEs
employed workers with experience from MNEs. Consistent with spillovers through
mobility, I estimate a robust and significantly positive correlation between the share
of workers with MNE-experience and the productivity of non-MNEs. Workers with
MNE-experience contribute 20% more to the productivity of their plant than workers
without experience from MNEs, even after controlling for differences in unobservable
worker characteristics. The difference between the private returns to mobility and
the productivity effect at the plant level suggests that labor mobility from MNEs to
non-MNEs represents a true knowledge externality.
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1 Introduction
The empirical literature on knowledge spillovers from foreign direct investment to host
country firms, treats the channels through which such spillovers may occur as a black
box. The labor mobility channel for spillovers has been highlighted both in theoretical
models (Fosfuri et al., 2001; Glass and Saggi, 2002), and in the empirical literature (for
a recent survey of the empirical spillover literature see Go¨rg and Greenaway, 2004). The
general approach of the empirical spillover literature is to regress a measure of domestic
plant productivity on a measure of foreign presence at the industry level. When measuring
foreign presence at the industry level it is not possible to capture the fact that domestic
firms may have different links with foreign-owned firms. The more contact domestic firms
have with foreign-owned firms, the more likely they are to benefit from spillovers. One
type of contact with foreign-owned firms is to hire workers from these firms. I use linked
employer-employee data to construct plant-specific measures for the share of workers in
domestic plants with recent experience from multinationals. By using this measure of an
explicit link between domestic and multinational firms in a productivity regression, I am
able to go beyond the ‘black box’-treatment of spillovers in the existing empirical literature.
The paper starts from the premise that foreign-owned firms are a relevant source of
spillovers because they are part of MNEs with firm-specific assets that can be transferred
across borders within the firm (Dunning, 1981; Markusen, 1995). It has recently been
argued that the firm-specific advantage hypothesis, which is thought to be a reason for
firms becoming multinational, should apply equally to domestic multinationals of the host
country (e.g. Bellak, 2004). The argument implies that the potential for spillovers should
primarily go from multinationals to purely local firms, regardless of whether a multinational
is foreign or domestically owned. The empirical analysis in this paper will therefore dis-
tinguish between plants that are part of multinational enterprises and plants that are part
of firms that only operate in Norway, hereafter called MNEs and non-MNEs, respectively.
In order for labor mobility to be a channel for spillovers from MNEs to non-MNEs, we
would expect to observe the following: First, MNEs should have a firm-specific advantage
that could be the basis for spillovers. If firms share rents with their workers, observing
a wage premium for workers in MNEs (that is not related to worker selection) would be
consistent with a potential for spillovers. Second, we need to observe some labor mobility
from MNEs to non-MNEs. Third, non-MNEs that hire workers with previous experience
from MNEs should benefit in terms of increased productivity. Fourth, workers who move
from MNEs to non-MNEs should benefit from mobility in terms of their own wages, as
2
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their experience from foreign-owned firms should be valued by their new employers. In
this paper, I use linked employer-employee data to assess the evidence on all four points
for Norwegian manufacturing during the 1990s.
The existence of a firm-specific advantage combined with evidence of actual mobility
can only suggest that a potential for spillovers through labor mobility does exist, while
a productivity benefit at the plant level due to mobility is consistent with labor mobility
actually working as a channel for spillovers. To what extent such spillovers can be regarded
as an externality, and not only as knowledge diffusion through market transactions, cannot
be determined from a positive productivity effect alone.1 An assessment of the size of the
productivity benefit together with information about the wage increase obtained by the
mobile workers may indicate to what extent a possible spillover is an externality. If the
productivity benefit at the plant level is larger than the wage premium granted to workers
with experience from MNEs, the evidence is consistent with a knowledge externality.
As a first exercise to assess the potential for knowledge spillovers from MNEs to non-
MNEs in Norwegian manufacturing, I look for evidence of a multinational advantage by
estimating individual wage equations for manufacturing workers. Following the recent
approach by Abowd et al. (2002), I estimate wage equations where both plant and worker
fixed effects can be identified. After controlling for positive selection of workers into MNEs,
there is still a remaining plant-specific component giving rise to a wage premium of 3%
in foreign MNEs. The results are consistent with a potential for spillovers from MNEs to
non-MNEs.
Little is known about the extent and pattern of labor mobility between MNEs and non-
MNEs in a developed country, despite the frequent claim that labor turnover is a potential
channel for spillovers.2 Martins (2006) is the first to provide such evidence for a developed
country, using a large panel of linked employer-employee data that covers virtually all
firms and their employees in Portugal from 1986 to 2000. He finds relatively small labor
flows between foreign and domestic firms. In this paper focus is on labor mobility within
manufacturing. I find that during my sample period from 1990-2000 14,400 workers leave
MNEs and start working in non-MNEs. This flow of workers translates into a growing
percentage of non-MNEs that have workers with experience from MNEs. In the year 2000
28% of non-MNEs employed one or more workers with recent MNE-experience, against
1Møen (2005) argues that if the hiring firm pays wages according to the marginal productivity of the
new employee, a productivity benefit in the hiring firms is not an externality.
2Some case study evidence of foreign to domestic mobility in developing countries exists, see references
in Saggi (2002) and Go¨rg and Strobl (2005). Poole (2009) documents mobility flows in linked employer-
employee data between foreign and domestic firms in Brazil.
3
SNF Working Paper No 25/09
11% of non-MNEs in 1993.
Given the extent of mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs, I proceed to estimate the ef-
fect of this mobility on the productivity of non-MNEs.3 Previously, this has only been
examined empirically by Go¨rg and Strobl (2005), who use firm level data for a sample
of manufacturing plants in Ghana. They find that firms whose entrepreneurs worked in
multinationals in the same industry prior to joining or setting up their own firm are more
productive than other firms, while experience from multinationals in a different industry
has no effect on firm productivity. In contrast to the data from Ghana, I can determine the
recent work history of all workers in non-MNEs. I include annual plant level measures of
the share of workers with recent MNE-experience in a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Based on an interpretation provided by Griliches (1967, 1986), I find that workers with
MNE-experience contribute 20% more to total factor productivity than workers without
experience from MNEs. This result cannot be explained by differences in worker charac-
teristics, and is consistent with the idea that labor mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs is a
channel for spillovers.
When looking at the wages of movers compared to colleagues with similar characteristics
in their new plant, I find that movers from MNEs to non-MNEs with more than 3 years’
of tenure from the MNE receive a wage premium of 5% compared to stayers in non-MNEs.
Thus experience from MNEs is clearly valued in non-MNEs. The difference in the private
returns to mobility for movers from MNEs to non-MNEs and the productivity effect these
movers have at the plant level, suggest that the hiring non-MNEs do not fully pay for the
value of these workers to the firm. Hence, labor mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs seems
to be a source of knowledge externality in Norwegian manufacturing.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the data sources,
followed by the empirical results regarding multinational wage premia in section 3. Section
4 contains descriptive evidence of labor mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs and section 5
investigates whether non-MNEs that hire workers with MNE-experience benefit in terms
of productivity. Section 6 asks whether movers benefit from mobility in terms of wages,
while section 7 concludes.
3Poole (2009) finds evidence consistent with mobility acting as a channel for spillovers in Brazil using
an approach of estimating wage regressions.
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2 Data
I use four different annual data bases for the years 1990-2000, all of which are censuses
that can be linked to each other by firm or plant identifiers. All the data sources are
administered by Statistics Norway. The starting point is the Norwegian Manufacturing
Statistics, which is collected at the plant level. From the Manufacturing Statistics, I use
information about production, input use, investment and industry classification (ISIC Rev.
2). As the main aim of the paper is to include measures of labor mobility into a plant
level productivity framework, plants with insufficient information to calculate a measure of
total factor productivity are excluded from the analysis. After this cleaning the remaining
data still contains around 90% of manufacturing output and employment.
In order to classify plants as MNEs or non-MNEs, I combine information obtained from
the record of foreign ownership of equity in Norwegian firms (the so-called SIFON-register),
and information from the register of outgoing foreign direct investment (FDI) from Norway.
Both registers can be linked to the Manufacturing Statistics with firm identifiers. For the
purpose of classifying plants as MNEs or non-MNEs, I use the information on the shares
of equity in Norwegian firms owned by foreigners from the SIFON-register, and the shares
of equity in firms abroad owned by firms in Norway from the register of outgoing FDI. I
define a Norwegian MNE as a firm that is not itself majority owned from abroad, while
it has direct ownership shares of more than 20% in operations abroad. A foreign MNE is
more than 20% foreign owned and at the same time not classified as a Norwegian MNE.
Finally, I link the administrative files containing the whole population of residents aged
16-74 to the plant level data. The administrative files contain, among other things, infor-
mation on age, gender, identification of the current employer, weekly work-hours, annual
earnings, start and end dates for the current employment spell and detailed education
codes.4 Weekly work-hours are recorded as a categorical variable in 4 groups, with the
longest work-hours being 30 hours or more per week. I use only workers that are recorded
as working 30 hours or more per week, and call these workers full-time workers (more than
90% of workers are full-time workers). As a proxy for wages, I use the recorded earnings
variable in the data, where earnings are measured as annual taxable labor income.5
Table 1 shows the total number of matched plants and full-time workers by type of
4See Møen et al. (2004) for documentation of the Norwegian linked employer-employee data sets.
5For the analysis of wages in Sections 3 and 6 I drop 135 000 individual observations (6% of the sample),
where the recorded earnings are considered too low for a regular full time earning. I set this threshold to
be below 12 000 NOK per month in 2001 prices. Dropping these low-wage observations does not affect the
results.
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Table 1: Foreign and domestic plants and workers
Number of plants Mean empl. Full-time workers
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1990 5211 249 216 27 83 179 141435 20634 38719
1991 4849 362 218 26 97 163 124921 35038 35607
1992 4739 390 240 25 96 161 119181 37474 38677
1993 4411 435 240 23 102 165 102155 44439 39600
1994 4455 497 219 24 92 177 106481 45742 38815
1995 4389 482 220 24 102 160 107243 49248 35108
1996 4296 512 203 24 103 151 101375 52715 30651
1997 4353 531 179 26 104 156 111495 55465 27958
1998 4352 559 169 27 99 173 115337 55217 29193
1999 4203 627 184 26 97 160 109798 60614 29381
2000 3996 619 212 26 94 122 104071 58237 25959
Notes: 1=Non-MNE; 2=Foreign MNE; 3=Domestic MNE
plant. The total number of manufacturing plants decreased from 5 676 in 1990 to 4 827 in
2000, and the total number of full-time workers went down from around 200 000 in 1990 to
190 000 in 2000. While the number of Norwegian MNEs and non-MNEs and the number
of workers in these plants declined from 1990 to 2000, the number of foreign MNEs and the
number of workers in foreign MNEs tripled during the same period. Plants of Norwegian
MNEs are substantially larger in terms of the average number of workers than plants of
foreign MNEs.
3 Is there a multinational wage premium?
A potential for spillovers from MNEs to non-MNEs requires that the local firms have some-
thing to learn from MNEs. One piece of evidence that would suggest such a potential is
that MNEs pay higher wages than non-MNEs. Through on-the-job-experience (or train-
ing), workers in MNEs may get access to part of the MNE’s superior technology, and bring
valuable knowledge with them to a new employer, or even set up competing business. In
order to prevent such knowledge diffusion, MNEs may share rents with their workers by
paying a wage premium to reduce labor mobility, as discussed in the theoretical models of
Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002). Budd and Slaughter (2004) argues that
a multinational wage premium could arise because of rent sharing across borders. Other
explanations for the wage premium are that it is a compensation for a higher probability
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of plant closure (Bernard and Sjo¨holm, 2003), or higher labor demand volatility (Fabri
et al., 2003). Both these hypotheses of compensating differentials are consistent with the
existence of a foreign wage premium, but do not necessarily imply that the MNE has a
firm-specific advantage that could be the basis for spillovers.6
For Norwegian manufacturing there are clear differences in unconditional mean wages
between non-MNEs, domestic MNEs and foreign MNEs, as can be seen from table 2. The
table further shows that in terms of individual characteristics, the three groups of plants
seem very similar, though education and tenure levels are slightly higher in MNEs than
in non-MNEs. The difference in education levels is reflected in the plant level skill shares,
where MNEs have higher shares of workers with 12 or more years of education than non-
MNEs. In terms of plant size and labor productivity, the domestic and foreign MNEs
are relatively similar; both types of MNEs are larger and have higher productivity than
non-MNEs.7
Table 2: Worker and plant characteristics: Average 1990-2000
Non-MNEs Foreign MNEs Domestic MNEs
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Real monthly wage 23,549 13,087 26,638 11,528 25,069 15,196
Tenure 7.35 6.13 7.90 6.42 9.29 6.56
Experience 22.46 12.45 22.49 12.02 22.55 12.35
Age 40.10 11.74 40.56 11.25 40.71 11.52
Years of schooling 10.64 2.03 11.07 2.30 10.92 2.33
Plant size 30.61 70.29 107.24 183.24 163.02 234.35
Labor Productivity 1224 1631 2102 8458 1817 1359
Skill share 0.38 0.23 0.45 0.21 0.40 0.20
Female share 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.24 0.21
Worker/Plant obs. 1,243,480/49,000 514,820/5,250 369,670/2,290
Notes: Experience=(age-years of education-7), plant size=number of employees, labor pro-
ductivity=real output per employee, skill share=share of workers with 12 or more years of
education.
6Several papers investigate the extent of so-called wage-spillovers, see Aitken et al. (1996), Girma et al.
(2001) and Driffield and Girma (2003). Foreign direct investment by high productivity firms might lead
to increased wages by affecting labor demand directly, but there could also be an indirect effect through
knowledge diffusion. As noted by Aitken et al. (1996), labor turnover and knowledge diffusion should
eventually increase wages also in domestic firms and thus reduce or eliminate the foreign wage premium.
As these studies do not follow workers between plants, they cannot say whether labor mobility played any
role in facilitating the wage-spillovers.
7Regressions of the characteristics in table 2 on year and industry dummies and dummies for MNE
status show that the differences between non-MNEs and MNEs in table 2 are not caused by MNEs and
non-MNEs being systematically located in different industries.
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When using plant level data for average wages it is a common finding that foreign
firms pay higher average wages than domestically owned firms, and that the foreign wage
premium is larger in developing countries than in developed countries.8 In many plant
level datasets it is not possible to control for the quality of the labor force when estimating
the foreign wage premium, thus part of the wage premium may be due to foreign firms
using more skilled labor than domestic firms. Studies of foreign wage premia using indi-
vidual wage data typically find smaller wage premia than studies using only plant level
average wages, confirming that part of the plant level premium can be explained by skill
composition (Heyman et al., 2007).
With the matched employer-employee data for Norwegian manufacturing, I estimate
the following individual wage regression
wit = β0 + β1DMNEj(i,t) ++β2FMNEj(i,t) +X
′
itβ3 + F
′
j(i,t)β4 + vt + vI + eit. (1)
wit is the log real monthly wage of worker i at time t, Xit is a vector of observable individual
characteristics and Fj(i,t) is a vector of observable plant characteristics for the plant j where
individual i is observed, while eit is an idiosyncratic error term. vt and vI are a set of
time and industry dummies. The main variables of interest are the indicator variables for
domestic and foreign MNEs; DMNEj(i,t) and FMNEj(i,t).
Table 3 reports the results from estimating equation (1) with additional sets of control
variables in each column. Column 1, which only includes year and industry dummies,
show a wage premium in foreign MNEs of 5.7% relative to non-MNEs, while the wage
premium in domestic MNEs is 3.2%. Adding variables for plant characteristics in column
2 decreases the estimated wage premium, and adding individual characteristics in column 3
further decreases the wage premium; to 3% in foreign MNEs and 0.6% in domestic MNEs.9
The results in column 3 are comparable to the 2% MNE premium found by Heyman et
al. (2007) in a very similar regression using Swedish data. One interesting difference is
that they find almost no difference in wage premia between foreign and domestic MNEs in
Sweden.10
Regressions based on equation (1) do not control for unobserved worker or firm-fixed
8See Heyman et al. (2007) and references therein.
9One explanation for the small change in the wage premium when adding individual characteristics,
once plant level characteristics are controlled for, is that the observable characteristics of workers are
quite similar in MNEs and nonMNEs, as Table 2 shows. Further, Norway is characterized by a relatively
compressed wage structure.
10Martins (2004) do similar OLS wage regressions using data from Portugal, and finds a foreign wage
premium of around 10% when controlling for both worker and plant characteristics.
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Table 3: Wage premia in multinational plants
OLS FE
Domestic MNE .032 .009 .006 -.004
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Foreign MNE .057 .036 .030 .003
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Year and industry dummies (140) yes yes yes yes
Plant characteristics no yes yes yes
Worker characteristics no no yes yes
Number of observations 2,122,584 2,122,584 2,122,584 2,122,584
R2 .19 .22 .44 .28
Notes: Dependent variable is log individual wage. Plant characteristics are log(number of
employees) and its square, share of female workers, share of workers with 12 or more years of
education, and log(capital per unit of output). Worker characteristics are education, a quadratic
in tenure, a quartic in experience, a gender dummy, and interaction terms between gender
and individual characteristics. All coefficients reported above are significant at the 0.1% level.
Standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses.
effects. The results reported in columns 1-3 of table 3 are therefore likely to be affected
by omitted variable bias. If MNEs to a larger extent tend to select workers with ‘better’
unobserved (to the researcher) characteristics, this may explain part of the wage premium.
Similarly, if MNEs make use of better technology, intermediate inputs or management, this
is a plant-specific advantage that may give rise to a wage premium through rent sharing
with workers.11 The argument that a multinational wage premium could signal a potential
for spillovers relies on the presence of such a plant-specific component in the wage premium.
Such a component of the wage premium could be related to the technology or management
of the firm, but should not be related to worker selection. Adding worker fixed effects,
vi, to equation (1) is one way of taking out the effect of possible selection of workers into
MNEs.
wit = β0 + β1DMNEj(i,t) ++β2FMNEj(i,t) +X
′
itβ3 + F
′
j(i,t)β4 + vt + vI + vi + eit. (2)
The results from estimating equation (2) are shown in column 4 of table 3. The wage
premium in foreign MNEs falls substantially, indicating a wage premium of 0.3%, while
there is a small negative wage premium in domestic MNEs.
11If MNEs do not share rents with workers, a plant-specific advantage may exist even though we do not
observe a wage premium in the data.
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The identification of the dummies for multinational status in equation (2) comes from
individuals that move between MNEs and non-MNEs, or from plants that change status.
Hence, the coefficient on the dummy variables for multinational status will capture a
mix of a mobility effect and an effect from changes in plant status.12 As 80% of the
workers in my sample are observed in only one manufacturing plant, the MNE dummies
are mainly identified from changes in plant status, and not from mobility. In cases where
the worker stays in the same plant, the unobserved worker fixed effect will fully absorb the
unobserved plant fixed effect. Martins and Esteves (2008), in their study of foreign wage
premia in Brazil decompose the wage premium from wage equations like (2) into parts
due to mobility, foreign acquisitions and foreign divestures by doing separate regressions
on movers and stayers, depending on the direction of move and the direction of change
in plant status. Since the main purpose of this section is to investigate whether there is
a plant-specific component in the wage premium, I proceed to estimate these unobserved
plant fixed effects directly.
The starting point is a wage equation like (2) with the addition of a plant fixed effect,
vj(i,t).
wit = β0 + β1DMNEj(i,t) ++β2FMNEj(i,t) +X
′
itβ3 + F
′
j(i,t)β4 + vt + vi + vj(i,t) + eit. (3)
Recent work by Abowd et al. (2002) has shown how the presence of labor mobility in linked
employer-employee data sets makes it possible to identify both the unobserved worker and
plant fixed effects. The identification of the two types of fixed effects in equation (3) relies
on worker mobility between firms, and the assumption of mobility being exogenous to the
included regressors. The method identifies in the data separate groups of workers and
plants that are connected via mobility. In my 11 year sample the largest group contains
around 99% of the observations used in table 3.13 The distribution of the plant fixed effects
identified by estimating equation (3) is plotted in the left part of figure 1. The kernel density
plots show that the distribution of the plant fixed effects of MNEs are shifted to the right
relative to those of non-MNEs. This is consistent with a plant-specific wage premium in
MNEs relative to non-MNEs even after controlling for worker selection on both observable
and unobservable characteristics. The right hand panel of figure 1 exhibits the distribution
12The changes in plant status that are captured by the foreign MNE dummy are foreign acquisitions
and foreign divestures. Changes in plant status captured by the domestic MNE dummy are establishment
or closure of affiliates abroad.
13I use the Stata routine developed by Cornelissen (2008) to implement the approach in Abowd et al.
(2002).
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of worker fixed effects for workers in MNEs versus workers in non-MNEs, the pattern for
the distribution of the unobserved worker fixed effects is similar to the pattern for the
distribution of plant fixed effects. Thus there is also evidence consistent with positive
worker selection into MNEs.14
Figure 1: Distribution of plant and worker fixed effects in MNEs and non-MNEs
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Notes: Kernel density plots for 1997. Density plots for all other years are very similar.
I also regress the calculated plant and workers fixed effects on dummies for MNE sta-
tus and 5 digit industry dummies. Column 1 of table 4 show the results for the regression
with the plant fixed effects as dependent variable. Foreign MNEs pay higher wages than
non-MNEs when unobserved heterogeneity in workers is taken into account in addition
to observed worker and plant characteristics. The plant-specific wage premium in foreign
MNEs is in the order of 3.5%, while there is no significant plant component of the wage
premium for domestic MNEs.15 Results for the worker fixed effect show that worker selec-
tion is of equal importance in domestic and foreign MNEs. Hence, I conclude that although
worker selection is an issue, there is also evidence of a plant-specific component of the wage
premium in foreign MNEs that could be the basis for potential spillovers.
14Martins and Esteves (2008) also find that the distribution of firm and worker fixed effects across foreign
and domestic firms in Brazil show a similar pattern as in figure 1 when they use a similar approach of
estimating both firm and worker fixed effects.
15The number of plants that identify the domestic MNE dummy in this regression are only 95, while
229 plants are classified as foreign MNEs all years.
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Table 4: Unobserved plant and worker fixed effects
Plant fixed effect Worker fixed effect
Domestic MNEs -.006 .037
(.009) (.002)∗
Foreign MNEs .035 .035
(.007)∗ (.002)∗
Industry dummies (140) yes yes
Number of plants/workers 5,185 182,412
R2 .14 .08
Notes: Dependent variables are the unobserved plant and worker fixed effects
identified when estimating equation (3). ∗= significant at 0.1%. The reference
group in column 1 consists of plants that are non-MNEs throughout the sample.
The reference group in column 2 consists of workers always employed by non-
MNEs.
4 The extent of labor mobility
If labor turnover is to act as a channel for spillovers from MNEs to non-MNEs, we must
observe workers who switch from MNEs to non-MNEs. The wage premium in MNEs
may induce workers to stay in MNEs rather than move to non-MNEs, and worker flows
may therefore be small. This section documents the size of the worker flows between
MNEs and non-MNEs from 1990 to 2000. In this period my data set contains in total
450 000 different manufacturing workers. 80% of these workers are only observed in one
manufacturing plant, while around 20% of the workers change plants within manufacturing
and generate around 110 000 incidents of job change. These 110 000 moves are classified
according to the direction of move and shown in table 5. Around 28,150 of these plant
moves are from MNEs to other MNEs (25% of 110 000), while 14,400 are from MNEs to
non-MNEs. Thus, 2 out of 3 workers moving from a MNE go to another MNE. Since more
than half of the jobs in manufacturing during this period is found in non-MNEs (see table
1) there is a disproportionate pattern of moves within the group of MNEs. The extent of
‘internal labor markets’ turns out to be more pronounced within the group of domestic
MNEs. One explanation for this feature is that domestic MNEs are more likely to be part
of multi-plant firms, with workers moving between plants within the firm.
Table 5 further shows that 45% of the plant changes in my sample occur between non-
MNEs. For the group of workers with low education this percentage is 49%, while only 28%
of the job changes among the university educated workers occur between non-MNEs. For
12
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Table 5: Job changes by direction of mobility
Education
All 1 2 3
Between non-MNEs 45.51 49.25 43.72 28.08
From non-MNE to MNE 15.91 15.65 16.19 16.45
From MNE to non-MNE 13.06 12.25 13.93 14.78
Between MNEs 25.52 22.85 26.17 40.69
Total moves (=100%) 110,377 61,736 39,431 9,210
Notes: 1=Non-technical education; 2=Vocational/technical education;
3=University education.
the university educated, the largest share of plant moves (40%) occurs between MNEs.16
Table 6: Share of workers in non-MNEs with MNE-experience
All Education
1 2 3
1993
Experience from MNEs 1.0 0.8 1.6 2.2
Experience from domestic MNEs 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.9
Experience from foreign MNEs 0.7 0.5 1.0 1.5
Total workers 89,795 64,254 22,890 2,651
2000
Experience from MNEs 2.7 2.1 3.9 3.9
Experience from domestic MNEs 0.8 0.5 1.3 1.5
Experience from foreign MNEs 2.0 1.6 2.9 2.5
Total workers 95,314 62,360 23,246 9,708
Notes: For definition of education groups 1, 2 and 3, see table 5.
As the analysis in this paper focuses on the possibility for spillovers through labor
mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs, we want to know to what extent workers in non-MNEs
have experience from MNEs, and to what extent non-MNEs have hired workers with MNE-
experience. Table 6 shows the percentage of workers in non-MNEs in 1993 and 2000 with
recent experience from MNEs. Recent MNE-experience is defined as having worked in
an MNE for one or more of the last three years. Thus, a worker must have worked in
16I have divided the workers into 3 groups based on detailed educational codes from Statistics Norway.
Group 1, the low-education group, includes individuals with missing education code and workers that have
completed up to 1 year of education after compulsory schooling. In addition, this group includes workers
with completed high school without technical fields. Group 2 includes workers with technical/vocational
education at the high school level, while group 3 includes workers with university education.
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a multinational for one or more of the years 1990-1992 to be counted as having MNE-
experience in 1993. In 1993 only 1% of the workers in non-MNEs have experience from
MNEs; roughly equally divided between foreign and domestic MNE-experience.17 In 2000
this share is more than doubled to 2.7%. The majority of those with MNE-experience have
experience from foreign MNEs, in line with the evidence reported above that internal labor
markets are more pronounced in domestic MNEs.
Although table 6 shows that only a small share of workers in non-MNE have recent
MNE-experience, in terms of the potential for spillovers, the interesting issue is how these
workers spread across the group of non-MNEs. This is illustrated in table 7, which tabulates
the percentage of non-MNEs in 1993 and 2000 that employ workers with recent experience
from MNEs. The percentage of plants employing workers with MNE-experience is much
larger than the percentage of such workers; 11.4% in 1993 (against 1% of workers) and
28.1% in 2000 (against 2.7% of workers). Hence, during the 1990s there is an increasing
share of plants that employ workers with previous experience from MNEs. In the next
section I proceed to investigate whether these workers have an impact on the productivity
of their new plants.
Table 7: Share of non-MNEs employing workers with MNE-experience
All Education
1 2 3
1993
Experience from MNEs 11.4 7.6 5.1 1.0
Experience from domestic MNEs 5.5 3.4 2.5 0.4
Experience from foreign MNEs 7.2 4.7 3.1 0.7
2000
Experience from MNEs 28.1 18.0 14.0 6.1
Experience from domestic MNEs 10.8 5.8 5.1 2.2
Experience from foreign MNEs 22.8 14.0 11.2 4.6
Notes: For definition of education groups 1, 2 and 3, see table 5.
17The percentage of workers with experience from domestic and foreign MNEs respectively, do not sum
to the percentage of workers with overall MNE-experience, because some of the workers may have recent
experience from both types of MNEs.
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5 Productivity spillovers through labor mobility?
The empirical spillover literature surveyed by Go¨rg and Greenaway (2004) has looked for
evidence of productivity spillovers from foreign to domestic firms by regressing a measure
of domestic plant productivity on a number of covariates, including a measure of foreign
presence in the industry or region. As argued by Go¨rg and Strobl (2005), this approach
treats the channels through which spillovers may occur as a black box. A measure of foreign
presence at the industry level is not able to capture the fact that firms within the same
industry have different degrees of contact with foreign firms.18 Domestic firms with explicit
contacts with foreign firms may be the most likely to benefit from knowledge diffusion.
Examples of contacts between foreign and domestic firms could be technology licensing,
R&D cooperation, or exchange of intermediate inputs. Unfortunately, information at the
firm or plant level on such links between MNEs and non-MNEs is rarely available. Go¨rg
and Strobl (2005) use a firm level data set from Ghana with information on whether the
owners of domestic firms have previous experience from MNEs, and thus has information
on a firm-specific link between domestic firms and multinationals. They find a positive
effect on the productivity of domestic firms if the manager has previous experience from
MNEs.
With matched employer-employee data it is possible to establish measures of explicit
links between non-MNEs and MNEs by constructing plant-year specific measures of the
share of workers in non-MNEs with recent experience from MNEs. I include such measures
in a Cobb-Douglas production function framework in order to study productivity spillovers
through labor mobility. Poole (2009) uses matched employer-employee data from Brazil
for the period 1996-2001 in order to study wage spillovers. She estimates wage equations
for incumbent workers in domestic firms and finds that their wages are positively affected
by the share of workers with experience from multinationals.
Empirical specification
In the following, the interpretation of the coefficient on the share of workers with MNE-
experience is based on Griliches (1967). He argues that in a Cobb-Douglas production
function one could ask whether different types of R&D expenditure are equally ‘potent’
18If foreign presence is measured in the same industry as the domestic plants are located, this measure
picks up intra-industry (also called horizontal-) spillovers, for examples see Aitken and Harrison (1999)
and Haskel et al. (2007). Regressions that include foreign presence in upstream or downstream industries
from the domestic plants pick up inter-industry (also called vertical-) spillovers, see Smarzynska-Javorcik
(2004).
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in generating productivity growth. I apply this idea to different types of workers: those
with experience from MNEs, (LM), and those without such experience (LN). Under the
spillover hypothesis, we would expect that LM should be weighted by a positive ‘premium’
δ in the production function. With two types of labor in the production function, effective
labor use, L∗, is
L∗ = LN + LM(1 + δ) = L(1 + δs),
where s is the share of labor with MNE-experience in the total use of labor. In the log
linearized version of a Cobb-Douglas production function where labor input is L∗, the
βL lnL
∗ term can be approximated by βL lnL+ βLδs. Hence, I estimate
lnYit = βK lnKit + βM lnMit + βL lnLit + βLδsit + vi + vt + vt ∗ vI + εit, (4)
where lnY , lnK, lnM , and lnL are the natural logs of output, capital, material and
hours in plant i, year t.19 The main variable if interest is sit; the share of workers with
experience from MNEs. When constructing the measures of sit, I use the same definition
of recent MNE-experience as used in tables 6 and 7 of the previous section: for a worker
to be counted as having MNE-experience in year t, the worker has to be observed in a
multinational for one or more of the years t− 3 to t− 1.20
Plant and time fixed effects, υi and vt, are included in equation (4). Any permanent
differences in productivity levels between different industries will be absorbed by the plant
fixed effects as long as plants do not change industries.21 By including a large number of
interaction terms between industry and year dummies in addition to the year dummies,
any systematic correlation between the share of workers with MNE-experience at the plant
level and both overall and industry-specific business cycles are controlled for.22 The large
19For variable construction, see the variable definitions in the appendix.
20sit is constructed from head counts in the matched employer-employee data, while Lit is taken from
the Manufacturing Statistics and is measured as total hours worked in the plant during the year. The use
of Lit together with sit in the same equation amounts to assuming that the share of matched workers with
MNE-experience approximates the share of hours by workers with MNE-experience. At the aggregate
manufacturing level the match of individuals to plants generates total manufacturing employment that
corresponds to what we would get by using the employment information from the Manufacturing Statistics.
At the plant level, the employment correspondence is more variable, thus I prefer to use the hours variable
from the Manufacturing Statistics in the production function rather than constructing labor input from
the number of individuals that I match to the plant level data.
21Only very few plants in the data set change industry, and all results reported in this section are
unchanged if industry dummies are included.
22The industry-year interaction terms are based on 28 industry dummies corresponding to the 3 digit
ISIC level.
16
SNF Working Paper No 25/09
number of industry-year interaction terms will also indirectly control for industry level time-
varying variables that proxy competitive pressure (e.g. concentration ratios and measures
of competition from abroad). Such variables are commonly used in the spillover literature,
see for instance Haskel et al. (2007).23
The use of firm fixed effects remove all permanent productivity differences between
plants that might be correlated with the propensity to hire workers with MNE-experience.
Hence the main variable of interest is identified by time-variation within plants in the share
of workers with MNE-experience. Therefore, I restrict the estimations of equation (4) to
non-MNEs that at some point during the time period from 1990 to 2000 hire workers with
MNE-experience.
The way I have constructed the measure for the share of workers with MNE-experience
implies that this measure captures the newly hired employees with MNE-experience in the
plant, where newly hired means hired in year t, t-1 or t-2. If workers that change plants
are better or more motivated than stayers in general, the effect of newly hired workers
with MNE-experience may apply equally to newly hired workers coming from non-MNEs.
Therefore I also include a measure for the share of newly hired workers coming from non-
MNEs. Hence, the possible identification of a spillover effect relies on the differential impact
of hiring a worker with MNE-experience over hiring a worker from another non-MNE.
Results
Table 8 presents results of estimating equation (4) on the sample of non-MNEs that at
some point hire workers with MNE-experience. In column 1 the coefficient on the share of
new workers with MNE-experience is positive and significant. The estimated coefficient is
0.1, and combined with the estimated labor input coefficient, this implies that δ = 0.27 (δ
is significant at the 1% level). This means that newly hired workers with experience from
MNEs contribute on average 27% more to the productivity of the plant than the incumbent
workers. The coefficient on newly hired workers without MNE-experience is positive, but
not significant. The difference in productivity premiums associated with the two types of
newly hired workers is 20% and is significant at the 10% level.
In column 2, the measure of MNE-experience is split into the shares of workers with
experience from foreign and domestic MNEs, respectively. The coefficient on the share
of workers with domestic MNE-experience is larger than that on the share of workers
23Such proxies for competition were first proposed by Nickell (1996) and include market shares, profit
margins, industry concentration and a measure of import competition. The inclusion of such variables do
not affect the results presented here.
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with foreign MNE-experience, but less precisely estimated. Hence the two coefficients are
not significantly different. If each of the shares are included alone the coefficients remain
more or less the same, but only the coefficient on the share of workers with experience from
foreign MNEs is significant. As shown in table 7 there are fewer plants that employ workers
with experience from domestic MNEs than foreign MNEs, in addition some of the workers
have experience from both types of MNEs. In the remainder of the paper I combine the
two types of MNE-experience and refer to MNE-experience in general.
Table 8: Spillovers from workers with MNE-experience
Sample Non-MNEs MNEs
Share of workers with
experience from:
MNEs .104 .099 .108 .039
(.038)∗∗ (.037)∗∗ (.038)∗∗ (.022)(∗)
Non-MNEs .026 .025 .028 -.047
(.019) (.019) (.018) (.047)
Domestic MNEs .132
(.076)(∗)
Foreign MNEs .066
(.037)(∗)
Large non-MNEs -.058
(.050)
MNEs (lagged) .091
(.030)∗∗
Non-MNEs (lagged) .024
(.019)
Log(Capital) .051 .051 .051 .048 .050 .046
(.007)∗∗ (.007)∗∗ (.007)∗∗ (.007)∗∗ (.008)∗∗ (.012)∗∗
Log(Materials) .526 .526 .527 .525 .518 .508
(.011)∗∗ (.011)∗∗ (.011)∗∗ (.011)∗∗ (.012)∗∗ (.014)∗∗
Log(hours) .376 .376 .377 .389 .378 .400
(.013)∗∗ (.013)∗∗ (.013)∗∗ (.013)∗∗ (.013)∗∗ (.013)∗∗
N 17016 17016 17016 17015 14667 10568
R2 .86 .86 .86 .86 .85 .82
Notes: Dependent variable: Log(Output). All regressions include year and industry-year interac-
tion dummies. ∗∗, ∗, (∗)= significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. Standard errors clustered on
plants in parentheses.
As multinationals tend to be larger than other firms, the effect we find may be due to
experience from large firms rather than experience from MNEs. If this is the case, we would
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expect workers coming from large non-MNEs to have a similar effect in the productivity
regression as the share of workers coming from MNEs. Column 3 of table 8 report the
results from a regression where a measure of the share of new workers coming from large
non-MNEs is included. The coefficient on this measure is not statistically significant.24
If new hires are systematically correlated with time varying unobserved productivity
shocks at the plant level, this will lead to an upward bias in the estimated coefficients
on the shares of newly hired workers. Since I have included new hires from both MNEs
and non-MNEs, correlation between time varying unobserved productivity shocks and new
hires in general would not cause bias in the difference between new hires from MNEs and
non-MNEs. But time varying productivity shocks that are correlated with the propensity
to hire workers with MNE-experience gives rise to an upward bias in the differential im-
pact of workers with MNE-experience. One example could be that plants investing in new
machinery consciously seek out workers with MNE-experience to implement these invest-
ments. In column 4 I repeat the regression from the first column and include as control
variables investment and the change in employment, to proxy for time varying shocks at
the plant level. This does not change my results. As an alternative way to control for
the possible correlation between productivity shocks and the propensity to hire workers
with MNE-experience, I lag the shares of newly hired workers with MNE experience. This
exercise is reported in column 5, again the results are largely unchanged.25
Columns 1-5 have all used the sample of non-MNEs in the regressions. The premise
of the analysis so far has been that the direction of spillovers through worker mobility is
from MNEs to non-MNEs, and consequently that spillovers are not relevant in the opposite
direction. In section 3 I argued that a plant-specific wage premium would be consistent
with a potential for knowledge diffusion through labor turnover. Since the results showed
that the plant fixed effect was on average higher in MNEs than in non-MNEs, my argument
implies that we should not find evidence consistent with spillovers from non-MNEs to MNEs
if we estimate equation 4 on the sample of plants that are not always non-MNEs. The
results from this exercise are reported in the last column of Table 8, and are consistent
with my argument.
24Non-MNEs are defined as large when they have more than 100 employees.
25An alternative method to control both for unobserved plant fixed effects and input simultaneity is to
use the GMM-System estimator recently developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). I have tried variations
of the GMM-System estimator using different lags of inputs and output as instruments. In all cases the
validity of the instrument set was rejected.
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Robustness: Spillovers or worker selection?
The results presented so far cannot rule out the natural alternative explanation for the
productivity premium associated with new workers with MNE-experience: that workers
with MNE-experience are better educated, have more experience or are positively selected
on unobservable characteristics compared to the other workers in the plant. Table 9 reports
results from different ways to control for human capital when estimating equation (4). In
column 1 I split labor input into 2 groups according to the length of their education, with
workers classified as having low education if they have less than 12 years of schooling. I
also split the shares of newly hired workers according to this classification. The results,
reported in column 1 of table 9, show a positive and significant effect for workers with
MNE-experience and low education, while none of the other coefficients are significant.
Table 9: Spillovers: Controlling for observed and unobserved human capital
Share of workers with
experience from:
MNEs, with education < 12 years .115
(.041)∗∗
MNEs, with education >= 12 years .006
(.115)
Non-MNEs, with education < 12 years -.034
(.075)
Non-MNEs, with education >= 12 years .031
(.020)
MNEs .084 .131 .081
(.036)∗ (.039)∗∗ (.029)∗∗
Non-MNEs .020 .037 .029
(.019) (.018)∗ (.018)
N 17016 17016 17016 15658
R2 .86 .86 .85 .86
Notes: Dependent variable: Log(Output). All regressions include log of capital, materials
and hours, and year dummies and year-industry interaction dummies. In column 1 labor
input is split into two groups according to education level. In columns 2-4 labor input is
defined according to equation (5) and adjusted with the average of education, experience
and unobserved worker fixed effects, respectively. ∗∗, ∗, (∗)= significant at 1, 5 and 10%.
Standard errors clustered on plants in parentheses.
If we believe that labor input is more effective at higher levels of education, effective
labor input L∗ in the Cobb-Douglas production function could be weighted with education
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levels. Hence I replace effective labor L∗ with
L∗ = LI e¯I +
∑
i=M,N
Lie¯i(1 + δi) = Le¯(1 + δMsM + δNsN). (5)
Subscripts I, M and N refer to incumbent workers, newly hired workers from MNEs and
new hires from non-MNEs, respectively. The shares of newly hired workers of type N
and M are adjusted with the average education level of the group relative to the average
education level in the plant: si = (Lie¯i)/(Le¯) for i =M,N . Results are reported in column
2 of table 9 and are similar to the results in column 1 of Table 8, though the coefficient
on the share of workers with MNE-experience is smaller than without controlling for the
education levels of the different types of workers. In column 3 I repeat the exercise of
column 2, this time weighting labor input with average experience instead of average
education. This increases the coefficient on the share of workers with MNE-experience.
When looking at the characteristics of workers in non-MNEs it is the case that movers
from MNEs to non-MNEs have on average longer education, but shorter experience than
stayers in non-MNEs, see table 12. Hence, the changes in columns 2 and 3 relative to the
comparable result in column 1 of table 8 are as expected.
As figure 1 of section 3 also showed clear evidence of positive self-selection of workers
into MNEs, the productivity premium associated with MNE-experience could be due to
selection on unobservable characteristics, and therefore controlling for observable differ-
ences between groups of workers may not be enough. One way to control for unobservable
characteristics is to repeat the exercise in columns 2 and 3, this time adjusting the labor
input of each type of worker, I, M and N , with the average worker fixed effect from the
fixed effect regressions in section 3. The results are reported in column 4. The coefficient
on the share of newly hired workers with MNE-experience is reduced, but still positive and
significant, and combined with the estimated labor input coefficient the result implies a
productivity premium of 21% relative to incumbent workers.26 The share of newly hired
workers from other non-MNEs does not have a significant impact on productivity.
As a further check on the selection issue, figure 2 shows the distribution of the worker
fixed effects in non-MNEs from estimating equation (3). The kernel density plots show
no clear differences in the distribution of unobservable characteristics between stayers and
workers coming to non-MNEs from other plants. Since the distribution of worker fixed
26The estimated input coefficients are not reported in table 9, but are very similar to reported coefficients
in table 8. The labor input coefficient in column 4 of table 9 is 0.385.
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Figure 2: Distribution of worker fixed effects in non-MNEs
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Notes: Kernel density plots of worker fixed effects estimated in section 3. Stayers are workers only
observed in one plant (non-MNE) during the sample period. Movers from non-MNEs are workers
observed in at least two different non-MNEs. Movers from MNEs are observed at least once in both a
MNE and a non-MNE.
effects in figure 1 of section 3 showed clear positive selection on unobservables for workers
in MNEs, one implication of figure 2 is that non-MNEs, when they hire workers from
MNEs, actually draw workers from the lower end of the ability distribution in MNEs. This
conjecture can be checked by wage regressions on workers in MNEs, where future movers
from MNEs are compared to stayers in MNEs. I do this by giving dummies to future
movers the last two years before they leave their plants and estimate wage equations using
plant fixed effects. The coefficients on the dummies will tell us whether future movers are
paid above or below stayers of similar observable characteristics in the same plant. The
results of such regressions are shown in table 10. In the first column, future movers to non-
MNEs are compared to all stayers in MNEs, and these movers are paid almost 3% lower
than stayers. Future movers to other MNEs are not significantly different from stayers the
last year before they leave, and are paid 1.3% more than stayers two years before they
leave.27 In the second column, future movers are compared to stayers that I observe at
least 5 years in the same plant, and this increases the negative premium of future movers
to non-MNEs.
27Workers that are only observed in one single manufacturing plant during my sample period are defined
as stayers.
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Table 10: Movers versus stayers: wages before move
Movers from MNEs to MNEs, 1 year before move .004 -.006
(.003) (.003)
Movers from MNEs to MNEs, 2 year before move .013 .001
(.003)∗ (.003)
Movers from MNEs to non-MNEs, 1 year before move -.029 -.043
(.004)∗ (.004)∗
Movers from MNEs to non-MNEs, 2 year before move -.017 -.030
(.004)∗ (.005)∗
N 354,039 296,352
R2 .51 .51
Notes: Wage regressions with plant fixed effects for workers in MNEs. Future movers
are only included in the sample the last two years before moving. The reference group
in column 1 consists of all workers only observed in one MNE during the sample period.
Column 2 further restricts the reference group to workers observed at least 5 years.
Control variables include the same plant and individual characteristics as in table 3,
as well as year and year-industry interaction dummies. ∗=significant at 0.1% level.
Standard errors clustered on individuals in parentheses.
Robustness: Different productivity measures
The Cobb-Douglas production function in equation (4) is restrictive in many respects.
Table 11 reports the resulting coefficients on the shares of newly hired workers with and
without MNE-experience from a number of alternative specifications of productivity. The
first column imposes constant returns to scale in the production function. Column 2
reports the result of a more general specification of the production function where the
input coefficients are allowed to vary across 3-digit industries.28 In the third column I use
as dependent variable the residuals from estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function
at the 2-digit industry level according to the method proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003). The method is developed in order to address the simultaneity problem in estimates
of production functions. In column 4 the dependent variable is a measure of total factor
productivity based on a multilateral index suggested by Aw, Chen and Roberts (2001).
The index is calculated separately for each 3-digit industry.29 Labor productivity is the
dependent variable in the last column of table 11. The results in table 11 all point in the
28I have also estimated equation (4) on each 2-digit sector separately, and this reveals that the result
is mainly driven by the Norwegian machinery and equipment sector. This is the largest manufacturing
sector in Norway, which employs around 35% of all manufacturing workers.
29The calculation of this index is explained in the appendix.
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same direction: newly hired workers with experience from MNEs contribute more to the
productivity of their plant than newly hired workers from non-MNEs.
Table 11: Robustness to different productivity measures
Share of workers with .094 .104 .067 .181 .215
experience from MNEs (.038)∗ (.030)∗∗ (.033)∗ (.074)∗ (.083)∗∗
Share of workers with .018 .036 .015 .112 .061
experience from non-MNEs (.019) (.017)∗ (.018) (.063)(∗) (.037)
N 17016 17011 17016 17016 17016
R2 .88 .88 .09 .03 .05
Notes: Column 1 and 2 are estimates of equation 4 with dependent variable log(output):
1 imposes constant returns to scale, 2 allow input coefficients to vary by 3-digit sector. In
columns 3-5 dependent variables are Levinsohn-Petrin residuals, a multilateral index of
TFP, and labor productivity, respectively. Year and year-industry interaction dummies
and plant fixed effects included in all columns. Standard errors clustered on plants in
parentheses, ∗∗, ∗, (∗)= significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively.
Taken together, the results presented here suggest that workers with MNE-experience
contribute 20% more to the productivity of their plants than their colleagues without such
experience (column 4 of table 9). The mean share of workers with recent MNE-experience is
2.8% for those non-MNEs that have workers with MNE-experience. Evaluated at the mean,
these plants have 0.6% higher TFP than plants that have not recruited workers with MNE-
experience. The productivity premium attributed to workers with MNE-experience is not
associated with newly hired workers in general, as we do not find a similar productivity
effect for newly hired workers without MNE-experience. The effects found are not likely
to be driven by differences in worker characteristics or selection of workers, as the results
are robust to controls for both observable and unobservable characteristics among workers
in non-MNEs. Finally, the results are robust to several different measures of productivity.
6 Do workers benefit from mobility?
The results of the previous section indicated that workers with experience from MNEs
are very important for the productivity of non-MNEs, and as such we would expect these
workers to be rewarded in their new plants. The potential process of spillovers through
labor mobility from MNEs to non-MNEs is similar to the process of R&D spillovers through
labor mobility. The literature on R&D spillovers and labor mobility uses a human capital
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framework and focuses in particular on the relationship between mobility and wages. Since
at least part of the knowledge acquired in a firm will move with the worker in the case of
mobility, workers that get access to training/knowledge should be willing to pay for this
by accepting a current pay cut in expectation of future private returns (Pakes and Nitzan,
1983).
Table 12 shows mean wage growth in percent from the year before moving to the year
after moving for different groups of movers. Their wage growth is also compared to the
mean annual wage growth of workers who never change plant (stayers). The average wage
growth of stayers is around 3% per year, while the movers experience wage growth of more
than 5% upon moving from their old plant to a new one. Workers that move from a MNE to
a non-MNE-experience on average a wage growth of 7%, while the wage growth for movers
in the opposite direction is 8.1%. These growth rates are higher than for workers that
change plants within the group of MNEs or non-MNEs (5.6 and 5.8%).30 The difference
between average wage growth in the year of moving compared to annual average wage
growth in the sample indicates that most job changes are voluntary, and that the movers
increase their wage as a result of moving. This is consistent with the view that workers
are attracted to their new plants by a deliberate policy by the hiring plant to acquire
new workers to get access to their knowledge. It is also consistent with the view that the
moving workers are earning a private return on general training received by the previous
employer, and that this return is larger with a new employer who has not paid any of the
training costs (Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999).
Table 12: Characteristics of movers and stayers
Movers from non-MNEs Movers from MNEs Stayers
non-MNEs MNEs non-MNE MNE non-MNEs MNEs
Wage before move 23,335 24,200 24,586 26,294 23,283 25,699
Wage after move 23,954 25,303 25,548 27,244 23,212 25,819
Wagechange 5.8 8.1 7.0 5.6 3.0 3.3
Tenure 4.6 3.9 4.0 6.4 8.6 9.0
Age 36.4 35.0 34.6 38.1 41.2 40.9
Education 10.8 11.0 11.2 11.2 10.4 10.9
N 23,215 8,170 6,388 15,569 57,3561 310,617
In Table 12 the wage growth for MNE to non-MNE movers and for non-MNE to MNE
30Martins (2006) and Pesola (2007) investigate the private returns to mobility from foreign to domestic
firms in Portugal and Finland, respectively. In Portugal foreign to domestic movers on average experience
a pay cut upon moving, while the opposite is the case in Finland.
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movers is very similar. In fact, the movers from non-MNEs to MNEs experience on average
a larger wage jump than movers in the other direction. As the wage growth numbers in
Table 12 are unconditional means, they may be systematically affected by the character-
istics of the movers or the plants they move between. For instance, when interpreting the
wage growth of 8.1% for movers from non-MNEs to MNEs, we must bear in mind that
most of these moves mean that the worker moves from a small plant to a larger plant
(as the average size of MNEs is much larger than for non-MNEs). And since wages are
positively correlated with plant size, the change in plant size may be an important factor
in explaining the wage growth for non-MNE to MNE movers.
In table 10 we saw that movers from MNEs to non-MNEs were negatively selected out
of their old plants, since they are paid around 3% below colleagues with similar observable
characteristics the year before they move. Figure 2 also showed that in terms of unobserved
worker characteristics, workers with MNE experience in non-MNEs are similar to the other
workers in non-MNEs. What remains to be seen is to what extent the experience from
MNEs are rewarded in their new plants. In order to investigate this I estimate wage
equations for workers in non-MNEs, and compare the wages of the movers to those of
stayers in non-MNEs. I use dummies to indicate workers who are new to the plant, and
take the reference group to be stayers.
wit = β0+
∑
s=l,m,h
βsMNEis+
∑
s=l,m,h
βsnonMNEis+X
′
itβ3+F
′
j(it)β4+vj+vt+vt∗vI+eit. (6)
As before, wit is the log real wage of worker i, Xit and Fj(it) contains the observable
individual and plant characteristics. MNEis is a dummy equal to one if the worker is new
to plant j, came from a MNE, and has tenure of s from the MNE. I divide tenure into low,
medium and high and set the thresholds at below 1 year, 1-3 years and 3 years and above
respectively. Similarly, nonMNEis is a dummy for workers that are new to plant j, but
came from a different non-MNE. In addition, equation (6) includes plant and time fixed
effects, and industry-year interaction terms.
Results are presented in table 13. In the first column, the reference group consists of
all stayers in non-MNEs, while the second column restricts the stayers to be observed at
least 5 years in the plant. Movers from MNEs to non-MNEs earn a wage premium relative
to the stayers in non-MNEs, and the wage premium increases with the length of tenure
from the MNE. Compared to all stayers, workers coming from MNEs with more than 3
years of tenure from the MNE earn almost 7% more than comparable workers in the same
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plant the first full year after they come to the non-MNE. The similar wage premium for
workers from other non-MNEs is 3,3%. If we compare these movers to stayers that are
observed many years in the plant, we naturally get a somewhat smaller wage premium for
the new workers, but still those moving from MNEs have a premium more than twice the
size of new workers form other non-MNEs.31 Thus, even though the results in Table 10
indicated negative selection of workers from MNEs to non-MNEs, these movers are clearly
doing better than their colleagues in their new plant.32
Table 13: Movers versus stayers in non-MNEs: wages after move
Movers from MNEs, MNE-tenure <1 year .011 -.011
(.008) (.009)
Movers from MNEs, MNE-tenure <1,3> years .049 .031
(.008)∗ (.008)∗
Movers from MNEs, MNE-tenure >=3 years .069 .048
(.008)∗ (.008)∗
Movers from non-MNEs, non-MNE-tenure <1 year .016 -.007
(.005)∗ (.005)
Movers from non-MNEs, non-MNE-tenure <1,3> years .042 .022
(.005)∗ (.005)∗
Movers from non-MNEs, non-MNE-tenure >=3 years .033 .019
(.004)∗ (.005)∗
N 450,540 363,522
R2 .47 .47
Notes: Wage regressions with plant fixed effects for workers in MNEs. Movers are only
included in the sample the first year after moving. The reference group in column 1 consists
of all workers only observed in one non-MNE during the sample period. Column 2 further
restricts the reference group to workers observed at least 5 years. Control variables include
the same plant and individual characteristics as in table 3, as well as year and year-industry
interaction dummies. ∗=significant at 0.1% level. Standard errors clustered on individuals
in parentheses.
31When repeating the regressions in table 13 using the sample of workers in MNEs, and comparing
stayers in these plants with workers coming from other plants, I find no evidence that movers from non-
MNEs to MNEs are rewarded for their experience from the non-MNE over and above tenure and experience
in general.
32Similarly, Martins (2006) and Pesola (2007) find that previous tenure from foreign plants pays off after
moving to domestic plants.
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7 Conclusions
The evidence provided in this paper is consistent with labor mobility from MNEs to non-
MNEs working as a channel for spillovers. First, as MNEs pay higher wages than non-
MNEs, this suggests that MNEs have a firm-specific advantage, and hence that there is a
potential for spillovers. Second, during the 1990s an increasing share of non-MNEs employ
workers with previous experience from MNEs. Third, workers with MNE-experience con-
tribute substantially to the productivity of their new plants. According to the estimates
in this paper, workers with MNE-experience contribute 20% more to the productivity of
non-MNEs than workers without such experience, even after controlling for unobservable
characteristics of the workers. Thus, mobility is clearly a channel for knowledge diffusion
in Norwegian manufacturing. Fourth, workers moving from MNEs to non-MNEs are re-
warded in terms of higher wages in their new plants. This private return to mobility is an
indication that the hiring plants value the knowledge these workers bring with them, and
it is consistent with the productivity effects found at the plant level.
The wage premium for movers from MNEs to non-MNEs with more than 3 years of
experience from MNEs is almost 5% compared to stayers in non-MNEs with similar char-
acteristics. This 5% wage premium is far less than the 20% productivity premium these
workers have relative to workers without MNE-experience in non-MNEs. The difference
between the wage premium and the productivity effect suggests that the hiring non-MNEs
do not fully pay for the value of the workers to the firm, and thus labor mobility from MNEs
to non-MNEs seems to be a source of knowledge externalities in Norwegian manufacturing.
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Appendix
Definition of variables used in the production function (4) in section 5.
Lit Number of person hours in the plant. Rented labor hours are calculated from the costs
of rented labor using the calculated average wage for own employees. Since only
blue-collar hours are reported prior to 1983, and only total hours from 1983, total
hours before 1983 are estimated by using information on the blue-collar share of the
total wage bill.
Kit The estimate of capital services uses the following aggregation:
Kit = Rit + (0.07 + δ
m)V mit + (0.07 + δ
b)V bit,
where Rit is the cost of rented capital in the plant, V
m
it and V
b
it are the estimated
values of machinery and buildings at the beginning of the year, δm = 0.06 and
δb = 0.02 are the depreciation rates. The rate of return to capital is taken to be 0.07.
The values for depreciation rates and the rate of return to capital are also used by
Salvanes and Førre (2003) using the same data. The estimated values of buildings
and machinery are obtained from information on fire insurance values. To reduce
noise and avoid discarding too many observations with missing fire insurance values,
these values are smoothed using the perpetual inventory method. Fire insurance
values are not recorded after 1995, thus from 1996 capital values are estimated by
adding investments and taking account of depreciation. Separate price deflators for
investment in buildings and machinery are obtained from Statistics Norway. The
aggregation level for the price deflators is according to the sector classification used
in the National Accounts, which is somewhere in between the 2- and 3-digit ISIC
level.
Mit Total cost of materials used. Since this variable in the data includes rented labor
and capital, I subtract these and allocate them to the labor and capital measures
respectively. The costs of materials used is deflated with a separate index of input
prices obtained from Statistics Norway. The aggregation level for the price defla-
tor is according to the sector classification used in the National Accounts, which is
somewhere in between the 2- and 3-digit ISIC level.
Yit Gross production value net of sales taxes and subsidies. Output is deflated with a
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separate index of output prices obtained from Statistics Norway. The aggregation
level for the price deflator is according to the sector classification used in the National
Accounts, which is somewhere in between the 2- and 3-digit ISIC level.
The multilateral index of TFP used as dependent variable in column 4 of table 11 is
proposed by Aw, Chen and Roberts (2001) as an extension of the index derived by Caves
et al. (1982). The index is calculated separately for each 3-digit sector, and takes as its
reference point a hypothetical average plant in the base year. The index tracks for each
plant the deviations in input use and output from this reference point of average input use
and average output in the base year. The index is calculated using the following formula
lnTFPit = (lnYit − l˜nYt) +
t∑
τ=2
(l˜nYτ − ˜lnYτ−1)
−
∑
j=k,l,m
1
2
(Sjit + S˜jt)(lnXjit − X˜jt)
−
t∑
τ=2
∑
j=k,l,m
1
2
(S˜jτ + S˜jτ−1)(l˜nXjτ − ˜lnXjτ−1).
(7)
where i denotes the plant, t year, and j the inputs of capital, labor and materials. Inputs
and output are defined as above. The first term expresses plant output in year t relative
to average output that year, and the second term sums the changes over time in average
output from the base year. Sjit is the plant level cost share for input j in year t, while
S˜jt is the average cost share of the sector in year t. This index measures the proportional
difference in the TFP of a plant in year t relative to the hypothetical plant in the base
year.
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